i) the Minister of Finance, and Government of Canada is required to
request, and that the Bank of Canada is statutorily required, whennecessary, to make interest-free loans, on the terms set out under s.18(i)and (j) of the Bank of Canada Act, RSC, 1985, c. B-2 (the “Act”)
for the purposes of “human capital” expenditures and/ormunicipal/provincial/federal “human capital” and/or infrastructureexpenditures;
ii) that the “Government of Canada”, the Minister of Finance, and Her
Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, with the Bank of Canada,
A/ have abdicated their statutory and constitutional duties with
respect to ss. 18(i) and (j) of the Bank of Canada Act which
subsections read:
18. The Bank may
…
(i) make loans or advances for periods not exceeding six months to the Government of Canada or the government of a province on taking security in readily marketable securities issued or guaranteed by Canada or any province;
(j) make loans to the Government of Canada or the government of any province, but such loans outstanding at any one time shall not, in the case of the Government of Canada, exceed one-third of the estimated revenue of the Government of Canada for its fiscal year, and shall not, in the case of a provincial government, exceed one-fourth of that government's estimated revenue for its fiscal year, and such loans shall be repaid before the end of the first quarter after the end of the fiscal year of the government that has contracted the loan;
B/ and further that the refusal to request and make (interest free)loans under s. 18(i) and (j) of the Bank of Canada Act hasresulted in negative and destructive impact on Canadians by thedisintegration of Canada’s economy, its financial institutions, increase in public debt, decrease in social services, as well as a widening gap between rich and poorwith an continuing disappearance of the middle class;
iii) that s. 18(m) of the Bank of Canada Act, and its administration and
operation, is unconstitutional and of no force and effect, in
Parliament and the government, including the Defendant Minister of
Finance, abdicating their duty to govern, and insofar, as monetary,
currency and financial policies, per se, are concerned, and in turn as
they effect socio-economic governance, have abdicated their
constitutional duty(ies)and handed them over to those international,
private entities, whose interests, and directives, are placed above the
interests of Canadians, and the primacy of the Constitution of
Canada, not only with respect to its specific provisions, but also with
respect to the underlying constitutional imperatives, and which
provision reads:
(m) open accounts in a central bank in any other country or in the Bank for International Settlements, accept deposits from central banks in other countries, the Bank for International Settlements, the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and any other official international financial organization, act as agent or mandatary, or depository or correspondent for any of those banks or organizations, and pay interest on any of those deposits;
iv) that the maintaining of minutes of meetings by the Governor of the Bank of Canada, with other central bank “governors” from other states and federation(s), as secret and not open to parliamentary and public view and scrutiny, constitutes:
A/ ultra vires action by the Governor of the Bank of Canada contrary tointer alia, s. 24 of the Act
B/ unconstitutional conduct by the Governor of the Bank of Canada;
v) that the Parliament of Canada, in:
A/ allowing the Governor of the Bank of Canada to hold secret the nature and content of his meetings with other centralbank(ers); and
B/ in not exercising the authority and duty contained in 18(i) and (j) of the Act; and
C/ enacting s. 18(m) of the Bank of Canada Act; has unconstitutionally abdicated its duty and function as mandated byss. 91 (1a), (3), (14), (15), (16), (18), (19) and (20) of theConstitution Act, 1867, as well as s. 36 of the Constitution Act, 1982;
vi) that the Minister of Finance is required to list expenditures(s) on“human capital”, including infrastructural capital expendituresrelating to “human capital”, as an “asset” and not a “liability” withrespect to budgetary accounting;
vii) that the Minister of Finance is required to list, in his budgetary
accounting, all revenues collected prior to the return of “tax credits” to individuals, and moreover, corporate taxpayers, with tax credits subtracted from the total revenue due, before subtracting total expenditures from total revenue, and arriving at either a budgetary “surplus” or “deficit” as required, inter alia, by s. 91(5) of the Constitution Act, 1867;
viii) that the defendants’ (officials) are wittingly and/or unwittingly, invarying degrees, knowledge, and intent, engaged in a conspiracy, along with the BIS, FSB, an IMF, to render impotent the Bank of Canada Act, as well as Canadian sovereignty over financial, monetary, and socio-economic policy, and in fact by-pass the sovereign rule of Canada, through its Parliament, by means of banking and financial systems, which conspiracy and elements of such tortious conduct are set out, ininter alia, Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc. [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959namely:
A/ that the Defendants’ (officials), including and together with the BIS, engage(d) in an agreement for the use of lawful and unlawful means, and conduct, the predominant purpose of which is to cause injury to the Plaintiffs, and all other Canadians;
B/ that the Defendants’ (officials), including and together with the BIS, engage(d), in an agreement, to use unlawful means and conduct, whose predominant purpose and conduct directed at the Plaintiffs, and all other Canadians, is to cause injury to the Plaintiffs and all other Canadians, or the Defendants’ officials should know, in the circumstances, that injury to the Plaintiffs, and all other Canadians, is likely to, and does result;
ix) that the privative clause in s. 30.1 of the Bank of Canada Act,
A/ does not apply to the seeking of “judicial review”, by way ofaction or otherwise, of declaratory relief with respect to any statutoryor constitutional ultra vires action and/or section of the Act, by way of declaratory relief, or any other prerogative remedy, available to hear and determine the statutory and/or constitutional limits or actions under the Act, in accordance with, inter alia, in Supreme Court of Canada’s pronouncement in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick [2008] 1 SCR 190, nor does it apply to seeking damages for ultra vires or unconstitutional damages:and
B/ if s.30.1 of the Bank of Canada Act is interpreted to soapply as a privative clause, then it is unconstitutional and of no force and effect for breaching the Plaintiffs’ constitutional right to judicialreview, as well as breaching the underlying constitutional imperatives of Rule of Law, Constitutionalism, and Federalism;
(b) damages in the amount of:
i) $10, 000.00 per plaintiff; and
ii) should the within action be certified as a class action proceeding,
$1.00 (one dollar) for every Canadian citizen/resident, to be calculated based on the last population figure published in the last census, in accordance with s. 91(5) of the Constitution Act, 1867;
which damages are on account of:
iii) the constitutional breaches pleaded in the statement of claim herein; and
iv) the conspiracy pleaded in the statement of claim herein;
(c) such further declaratory and/or consequential injunctive and/or prerogative order and/or relief as counsel may advise and this Honourable Court grant;
(d) costs of this action and such further or other relief this Court deems just.
THE PARTIES
2. (a) the Plaintiff, Committee for Monetary and Economic Reform (hereinafter
“COMER”) historically to date is an international economic “think-tank”, based in Toronto, and was established in 1970, dedicating itself to the monetary and economic reform policies of Canada and conducts research, analysis, and publication(s) on these issues. For the past 23 years it has published a monthly publication entitled COMER with articles and analysis from various authors including some of its own committee members. Its committee members have consisted of economists, academics, and published authors expert in their respective fields;
(b) the Plaintiff, William Krehm, is and has been a member of COMER, since its inception, and has devoted much of his life to the study, research, analysis and writing on economic, monetary, and social reform, and is a published author on economic and monetary reform, included various articles, papers, as well as books as recent as 2010;
(c) the Plaintiff, Ann Emmett, is a member of COMER, and has devoted much of her life to the study, research, analysis and writing on economic, monetary, and social reform, and is a published author on economic and monetary reform, included various articles, and papers, as recent as 2010;
(d) the Defendant, Her Majesty the Queen, is statutorily and constitutionally liable for the acts and omissions of her officials pursuant to s. 17 of the Federal Courts Actas well as s. 24(1) and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982;
(e) the Defendant, the Minister of Finance, is statutorily and ultimately, with the consent of Governor-in-Council, responsible for overseeing both the Bank of Canada, as well as the Governor of the Bank of Canada, pursuant s.14 of theBank of Canada Act, and the Minister of Finance is also, constitutionally, responsible for setting out the budgetary process, and expenditures for each session of Parliament, upon the appropriation request, through the taxing power, of Her Majesty the Queen, as set out in Her Parliamentary throne speech delivered by the Governor General for that purpose;
(f) the Defendant, the Minister of National Revenue, is statutorily responsible for administering the Income Tax Act, and other Federal taxing statutes related to the collection of revenue through, inter alia, the taxing power, under s. 91(3) of theConstitution Act, 1867;
(g) the Defendant, the Attorney General of Canada, is, constitutionally, the Chief Legal Officer, responsible for and defending the integrity of all legislation, as well as responding to declaratory relief with respect to legislation, including with respect to its constitutionality and required to be named as a Defendant in any action for declaratory relief.
THE FACTS
3. The Plaintiffs state, and the fact is, that The Bank of Canada was established as
Canada’s central bank, in 1934, and nationalized in 1938,with the intended purpose of:
(a) Asserting domestic and public control of monetary and economic control andpublic policy pursuant to its constitutional sources of jurisdiction contained
in s. 91 and 91 A of the Constitution Act, 1867, namely:(i) 1A. The Public Debt and Property;
… (ii) 3. The raising of Money by any Mode or System of Taxation; (iii) 4.The borrowing of Money on the Public Credit;
… (iv) 14. Currency and Coinage;
… (v) 16. Savings Banks;
… (vi) 18. Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes; (vii) 19.Interest; (viii) 20. Legal Tender. and as set out in s. 18 of the Act and its predecessor provisions;
(b) to be a vehicle to provide the Federal and Provincial governments interest-free loans for physical infrastructure as well as “human capital” expenditures (education, health, other social services); and
(c) maintain sovereign control over credit and currency with the aim to promote the economic interests of Canada in all its aspects.
4. The preamble to the Bank of Canada Act, upon its enactment in 1934, as a private
corporation, and as re-enacted as a Crown corporation in 1938, read as follows:
WHEREAS it is desirable to establish a central bank in Canada to regulate credit and currency in the best interests of the economic life of the nation, to control and protect the external value of the national monetary unit and to mitigate by its influence fluctuations in the general level of production, trade, prices and employment, so far as may be possible within the scope of monetary action, and generally to promote the economic and financial welfare of the Dominion: Therefore, His Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and House of Commons of Canada, enacts as follows:
5. The Plaintiffs state, and the fact is, that the current Bank of Canada Act, continues
to reflect a public statutory duty and responsibility, as borne out by the preamble to
the Act, which reads:
WHEREAS it is desirable to establish a central bank in Canada to regulate credit and currency in the best interests of the economic life of the nation, to control and protect the external value of the national monetary unit and to mitigate by its influence fluctuations in the general level of production, trade, prices and employment, so far as may be possible within the scope of monetary action, and generally to promote the economic and financial welfare of Canada
6. The Plaintiffs state, and the fact is, that the Bank of Canada is the only “public” central bank created by statute, and accountable to the legislative and executive branches, to be found in any of the G-8 nations. All other central banks are “private” banks and are not directly created nor governed by legislation nor directly accountable nor reportable to the legislative or executive branches of the governments in the nations in which they operate.
7. The Plaintiffs state, and the fact is, that Policies such as interest rates, and other policies set by the Bank of Canada are set in consultation, and at times, but mostly at the direction of the “Financial Stability Board” (“FSB”), established after the 2009 “G-20” London Summit in April, 2009. The FSB is a successor of the “Financial Stability Forum” (“FSF”). The current FSB, like its predecessor, is an international body of central bankers that monitors and makes recommendations about the global
financial system. The Board includes all major G-20 major economies, FSF members, and the European Commission. The FSB is based in Basel, Switzerland.
8. The Plaintiffs state, and the fact is, that the current FSB, like its predecessor FSF,continues to serve the same function. It consists of the major national financial authorities such as Finance Ministers, central bankers, and international financial bodies.
9. The Plaintiffs state, and the fact is, that the FSF was and is managed by a small secretariat, which secretariat was housed at the “Bank of International Settlements” (“BIS”) in Basel, Switzerland. It was established by the Hague Agreements, in 1930, prior to the creation of the Bank of Canada.
10. The Plaintiffs state, and the fact is, that the BIS is a so-called inter-governmentalorganization of central banks which purports to execute financial co-operation and purports to serve as a “bank for central banks”. The Plaintiffs state, and the fact is, that the BIS in fact formulates policies and dictates to central banks, including the Bank of Canada.
12. The Plaintiffs state, and the fact is, that Canada, through its Bank of Canada, became a member of an expanded BIS in 1974. The Plaintiffs further state, and the fact is, that between 1934 to 1974 the Bank of Canada, and Canada, was completely independent, from international private interests, with respect to its statutory duties under the Bank of Canada Act, as well as its monetary and financial policies reflected in the preamble to theAct, and as it flowed through to its economic and social policies. The Plaintiffs further state, and fact is, that since 1974, there has been a gradual, but sure, slide into the reality that the Bank of Canada and Canada’s monetary and financial policy are in fact, by and large, dictated by private foreign bank and financial interests, contrary to the Act.
13. The Plaintiffs state, and the fact is, that the BIS is not accountable to any government. It holds annual meetings, which are secret, and provides banking services to central banks, including the Bank of Canada.
14. The Plaintiffs state, and the fact is, that the BIS is effectively in control of the FSB when it comes to credit, currency, monetary and financial policies for G-20 countries, including Canada, with far-reaching economic and social impact not in the interests of either the Bank, government, nor people of Canada.
15. The Plaintiffs state, and the fact is, that the meetings of the BIS and FSB, their minutes, their discussions, and deliberations are secret and not available to Parliament, the executive, nor the Canadian public, notwithstanding that the Bank of Canada policies directly emanate, and are directed by these meetings.
